Moreover, since [P1] states a necessary condition for the justified acceptance of any proposition not about the occurrence of an observation or intuition, acceptance of [P1] itself is justified only if it satisfies the very requirement it articulates.
If intuitions are evidence which non-inferentially justify belief, then even if one ought to suspend judgment in the aforementioned kind of case, it will not follow that one ought to do so in the case of intuitive disagreements. This is because all versions of dogmatism are themselves justified entirely on intuitive grounds—by the fact that they properly accommodate our various intuitions about the conditions under which a person has non-inferential propositional justification.
This project is motivated both by the general conviction that empirical claims, such as those regarding the extent to which some belief or intuition is shared by others, require adequate empirical support, and by the suspicion that what philosophers find intuitive or regard as commonsensical may be the result of their specialized training, theoretical allegiance, or general cognitive biases Nadelhoffer and Nahmias So, while it will be the case that the use of intuitions as evidence cannot be defended, it will also follow that the reliance on perception, memory and introspection can also not be defended.
Unfortunately, because [P1] is a normative proposition about when a belief is justified, it is difficult to see how its truth could play any role in the explanation of the occurrence of any of our experiences or intuitions. The proposition that there are mountains is, however, not the content of an intuition on any of the accounts in this family.
There is no particular reason to think that our intuitions lack explanation while our other mental states have an explanation. Those who wish to distinguish the states involved in scientific thought experiments from those typically involved in philosophical inquiry may either endorse [A7] and reject the suggestion that such physical intuitions involve the same intellectual seeming or impose further conditions on those intuitions of distinctive philosophical relevance as in the following accounts: The Flagpole Case Bromberger Suppose that a flagpole is standing on level ground in bright sunshine.
However, many claim that the primary notion of intuition is one on which S has an intuition that p only when S is occurrently in the relevant conscious psychological state.
In this connection, it is worth considering the views of various theorists who hold that perceptual experience can basically represent, and present to a subject, propositions featuring sophisticated properties well beyond phenomenological ones Siegel See Chudnoff a and Koksvik for attempts to help such skeptics by describing carefully that which they should seek.
This fact has been alleged to make a certain sort of epistemic modesty though not complete skepticism about the theoretical accomplishments of philosophy quite reasonable Christensen Such research has shown that agents with sufficient experience in a given domain e.
A third, more general, worry is that such surveys run a risk of eliciting from subjects responses determined by something other than their intuitions regarding the answer to the survey question—e.
The issue is quite complicated and the research moving quickly, but it appears that quite a few of the claims of cultural or gender differences have not proved robust Seyedsayamdost; Adleberg et al.
The possibility of such a defense is the result of the same fact that revealed that all of the extant local skeptical arguments run afoul of the non-self-undermining constraint—the fact that intuitions seem to be the only source of justification for claims about justification, reason, evidence, and other epistemic properties.
A yet more discriminating etiological amendment to the belief analysis Ludwig It is closely associated with mathematical knowledge, which forms the basis of intuition.
Whether or not apparent perception that p, introspection that p, or apparent memory that p justify us in believing their content is, it seems, a question they cannot answer as their content is never epistemic.
Alternatively, if epistemic circularity is sometimes acceptable, then no reason has been provided why it is not acceptable in the case of rational intuition. He argues that these truths are accessed using a knowledge already present in a dormant form and accessible to our intuitive capacity.
However, [A4] appears too liberal in placing no constraints on the nature or source of the disposition in question. It would also require detailed accounts of the de dicto and de re attitudes. Indeed, even before such reasoning, one might suspend belief about the contradictory set while each remained intuitive.
Moreover, one may doubt that a given account of the nature of intuitions is correct without doubting that intuitions exist.
Many contemporary skeptics, however, wish to appeal to interpersonal disagreement as justification for their skepticism.
Indeed, there seems equally good reason to think that the propositions which are the contents of most philosophical intuitions will not be part outside of attitude contexts of the best explanation of our having those intuitions. According to perceptual dogmatism, a person having a perceptual experience or a perceptual seeming with propositional content p is thereby prima facie justified in believing p Pryor Some psychological research seems similarly permissive.
Hence, we may reformulate the argument as follows in order to provide it with a more plausible normative premise: We must be careful to distinguish between interpersonal conflicts of intuitions and conflicts between beliefs or between beliefs and intuitions. An analogous claim is true in the perceptual case as well, as when one sees an object which is well camouflaged and another claims not to see it.
For example, someone who has had more experiences with children will tend to have a better instinct about what they should do in certain situations with them.
Experimental Philosophy and Intuitions 4. He provides an example of mathematical truths, and posits that they are not arrived at by reason.
Nothing precludes experimental philosophers from circumventing some of the concerns just noted by using experimental paradigms other than the administering of surveys. More precisely, he holds that in order for a given act or agent to have a different moral status it or they would have to differ in some non-moral way and then we often would not take it or them to have the same moral status.Alongside these developments there has been an upsurge of interest in the role of intuition in management as one way of overcoming the limits of rationality in loosely structured situations,.
In this context intuition may be defined as “a cognitive conclusion based on decision maker’s previous experiences and emotional inputs” [30.
Just as our intuition is less than perfect, so in general is our information. Using information (remember that it needs to be as complete as possible, accurate and up to date — none of which come free) to enhance and support intuition ought to be the objective.
The role the body plays in intuition has been the focus of much research, due to the relatively easy methods available for measuring physiological phenomena. For example Bechara et al () carried out an interesting study in which participants had to play a game involving risk but without knowing the rules.
Although intuition is an individual process, the communication of a vague intuition to others is critical for formulating a more concrete idea, which can be assessed and eventually implemented by the top management team.
Thus intuition also plays a major role in the evolution of mathematical concepts. The advance of mathematical knowledge periodically reveals flaws in cultural intuition; these result in "crises," the solution of which result in a more mature intuition.
Is the intuition for or against during decision makinng? Descartes, Gilles Deleuze or Punset are some of the thinkers who have sought to answer.Download